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Both the choice and crowding hypotheses can explain occupational wage differentials. If wage differentials are the product of
choice, there is no cause for concern because individuals who freely
choose to enter a lower-paying occupation cannot be worse off. If
wage differentials are the product of crowding (discrimination), we
demonstrate that the best solution is to attack barriers to entry
directly rather than impose a minimum wage in female-dominated
professions. Imposing comparable worth in the form of a minimum
wage in female-dominated occupations is both inefficient and inequitable for the reasons developed in our principal paper."
When the rhetoric is swept aside, Becker and Holzhauer appear to make essentially two substantive arguments in response:
(1) barriers to entry are so pervasive that they cannot be eliminated and, given the existence of these barriers, comparable worth
may make things better; and (2) employers in female-dominated
occupations have market power. We briefly discuss these points
below.
I. PERVASIVE DISCRIMINATION AS THE BARRIER TO ENTRY
Becker and Holzhauer apparently believe that discrimination
against women is pervasive at the societal level and that this justifies comparable worth. The fundamental problem with this argument, as we demonstrated in our principal paper, is that there is
no connection between the injury (discrimination by society as a
whole) and the remedy (sanctions against particular employers
who by definition have not engaged in any discrimination). These
employers have willingly hired women and have paid men and
women who are hired the same wage. Imposing comparable worth
penalizes employers who have engaged in socially desirable conduct by hiring women, penalizes nondiscriminating employers relaI Fischel & Lazear, Comparable Worth and Discriminationin Labor Markets, 53 U.
CHi. L. REv. 891 (1986).
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tive to discriminating employers, 2 and provides little or no assistance to those who have been hurt the most by discrimination.
Comparable worth also aggravates the problem of excess supply in
female-dominated occupations.
One additional point: Because Becker and Holzhauer dispense
with the need for a showing of discrimination by a particular employer, they have no tools for identifying when to intervene in labor markets, against whom, and how much. Although they ignore
these basic issues, the logical implication of their position is that
all employers, public or private, who pay the market wage for secretaries (or any other female-dominated profession) are subject to
sanction if the market wage is less than the wage predicted by a
consultant's index. This is a curious result for Becker and Holzhauer to endorse since neither disputes our argument concerning
the inherent unreliability of wage studies that do not use market
prices as benchmarks. Nevertheless, their willingness to impose
sanctions against employers who have not engaged in any discrimination leads inevitably to this untenable position.

II. MARKET POWER OF EMPLOYERS
Becker and Holzhauer also assert that employers in femaledominated occupations have market power-the ability to set
wages below the competitive level. Holzhauer contends that such
employers are monopsonists; Becker contends that employers pay
lower wages in female-dominated occupations precisely because
they are female-dominated.
Holzhauer asserts that employers in female-dominated occupations are monopsonists and that, under these circumstances, imposing a minimum wage may improve efficiency. The point that
minimum wages can improve efficiency if employers are monopsonists is a standard one in the literature. But it provides no support for comparable worth. First, the monopsony argument is in no
way limited to female-dominated occupations. If employers have
monopsony power in female-dominated occupations, then presumably they have the same power in male-dominated occupations.
Thus, the monopsony explanation is incapable of explaining occupational wage differentials, particularly since such differentials
have persisted over long periods of time.
Second, the efficiency gains from imposing a minimum wage in
a monopsonistic industry exist only if there is underemployment.
I Id. at 908-09.
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But under the assumption that crowding has caused overemployment in female-dominated occupations, increasing employment
further by imposing a minimum wage is perverse. The goal is to
reduce employment in female-dominated professions, not to aggravate the initial problem by inducing even more overemployment.
Third, the notion that comparable worth is really an attempt
to do something about monopsony is implausible. Consider the
nursing profession, the profession that Holzhauer uses as the paradigmatic example of monopsony. The state-the defendant in
comparable worth cases brought by nurses-employs only a small
percentage of all the nurses in the labor market. Most nurses are
hired by private employers. The same is true for secretaries and
other clericals. Under these circumstances, the assertion that the
state has the ability to set compensation of secretaries and nurses
at below the competitive level is extremely improbable. Teachers
present a slightly harder case because a higher percentage of teachers are employed by public bodies, but even there school districts
compete against each other. No one school district has more than a
trivial amount of market power.
Finally, let us make the highly unrealistic assumption that
wages in female-dominated occupations are set at below the competitive level as a result of a massive cartel of discriminating employers. The proper solution, as we have emphasized throughout, is
not to adopt comparable worth, but rather to attack the cartel directly under the antitrust laws.
Becker's argument that wages in female-dominated occupations are lower because they are female-dominated also appears to
assume a massive cartel of discriminating employers. If there were
no such cartel, wages would be bid up to the competitive level. We
have discussed above why the existence of such a cartel is implausible and why, even assuming such a cartel exists, comparable
worth is the wrong remedy.
An alternative interpretation of Becker's argument is that
wages in female-dominated occupations are set at the competitive
level, but that societal discrimination causes this level to be lower
than it would be in the absence of discrimination. At this point,
the argument becomes indistinguishable from the societal discrimination as a pervasive barrier to entry argument discussed in Part I
above. As demonstrated there and in our principal paper, pervasive
societal discrimination, even if we assume it to exist, provides no
justification for comparable worth.

